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 
Abstract—This paper looks into the vulnerabilities of the 
electric power grid and associated communication network, in the 
face of intermittent power generation and uncertain demand 
within a complex network framework of analysis of smart grids. 
The perspective is typical for the system of systems analysis of 
interdependencies in a critical infrastructure (CI), i.e. the smart 
grid for electricity distribution. We assess how the integration of 
the two systems copes with requests to increase power generation 
due to enhanced power consumption at a load bus. We define 
adequate measures of vulnerability to identify the most limiting 
communication time delays. We quantify the probability that a 
reduction in the functionality of the communication system yields 
a faulty condition in the electric power grid, and find that a 
factual indicator to quantify the coupling strength between the 
two networks is the frequency of load-shedding actions due to 
excessive communication time delay. We evaluate safety margins 
with respect to communication specifications, i.e. the data rate of 
the network, to comply with the safety requirements in the 
electric power grid. Finally, we find a catastrophic phase 
transition with respect to this parameter, which affects the safe 
operation of the CI. 
 
Index Terms—Complex Networks, System of Systems, Critical 
Infrastructures, Smart Grids, Interdependencies, Vulnerability 
Analysis, Uncertainty 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE life and development of modern Societies is supported 
by critical infrastructures (CIs), like the transport and 
communication networks or the electrical grid, which grant the 
necessary continuous production and distribution of goods and 
services [1]. 
A characteristic of these CIs is that they are highly 
interconnected and mutually dependent, i.e. interdependent, in 
complex ways, both physically and through information and 
communication technologies used for data acquisition and 
control, leading to the concept of "systems of systems" [2]. 
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This brings the need of assessing and controlling the 
influences and limitations which interacting CIs impose on 
their operating conditions [3]. 
In particular, a focal subject of interest today is the 
evolution of the networks for electrical energy supply and their 
conception/renovation as “smart” grids [4]-[8] with distributed 
generation, as opposed to the centralized power generation 
structure of the existing electric power grids. One key aspect 
characterizing smart grids is the combination of the electric 
power grid with an information and communication network to 
“improve the observability and controllability of the 
distribution grid and thereby convert it from a static 
infrastructure to be operated as designed to a flexible, dynamic 
infrastructure operated proactively” [4]. 
The concepts and configurations of smart grids vary 
sensibly with respect to the implementation at the different 
levels of the electrical infrastructure, i.e. the transmission and 
distribution systems (the level of the individual costumer, and 
the related pricing issues, lies beyond the scope of the study 
presented in this paper) [5]. 
At the level of the transmission system, the efficiency and 
stability of power system operation could be improved 
substantially by phase angle measurements at many key 
locations and the use of Flexible AC Transmission System 
control devices (FACTS), combined with distributed and 
autonomous control strategies and high-speed communication.  
The level of the distribution system is the one usually 
referred to when introducing concepts of smart grids. Unlike 
the transmission grids that are arranged as meshed networks, 
the distribution networks form tree-like, radial structures, 
characterized by a central distribution hub where power enters 
and is routed to the loads along the parallel branches of the 
distribution feeders. If a malfunctioning occurs, circuit 
breakers automatically disconnect the entire feeder. The use of 
multiple power injection points, and sensors and remote 
control switches that can isolate and cut off the problem would 
guarantee the continuous power supply to the other buses of 
the feeder [9]. Furthermore, at present stage the disconnection 
of the entire feeder is the only strategy to balance a load excess 
when generation is suddenly lost due to an emergency. 
Conversely, a combination of smart meters and advanced 
distribution automation would allow controlling individual 
loads along a distribution feeder so that critical services (such 
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as police stations, hospitals, emergency services) can remain 
connected, while loads that provide less critical services can be 
dropped. Furthermore, the deployment of small-size diffuse 
generation would relieve stresses on transmission and 
distribution systems, and allow the disconnection of the 
distribution feeder from the main power system to run it as an 
isolated island, serving only a few critical loads in case of an 
emergency (this is not currently allowed for technical, legal, 
safety, and regulatory reasons). 
Irrespective of the system level under consideration, the 
smart grid is an auto-balancing, self-monitoring power grid 
that has the ability to sense when a part of its system is 
overloaded and reroute power to reduce overload and prevent 
a potential outage situation. It enables real-time 
communication between users and utility, allowing optimal 
energy usage, and the introduction of renewable energy 
sources for minimizing the collectivity environmental footprint 
[4]. 
The use of renewable energy sources poses challenges to the 
design and the operations of the electric power grid. The 
availability of these sources is strictly dependent on the 
climatic conditions, i.e. cloud cover or wind speed and 
steadiness. Then, the power output of solar and wind electric 
generators is affected by uncertainty and intermittency [10]-
[12]: paradoxically, due to its intrinsic stochastic nature, 
electric power from renewable sources could be abundantly 
available when it is not needed, while scarce in other cases of 
necessity. Moreover, electrical energy from renewable sources 
is typically produced in remote areas, e.g., where strong and 
steady winds are available or solar power plants can be 
conveniently located. This power has to be routed through the 
transmission network and delivered to distant locations where 
it is consumed. Yet, the existing power transmission 
infrastructure is not currently designed to carry intermittent 
electrical flows with possibly large peak flows, and in some 
cases it is inadequate to serve new remote power plants. As an 
example, a recent study [13] commissioned by the Italian 
Association of Energy Producers from Renewable Sources 
(APER) has estimated that between 2008 and 2009 the wind 
farms located in Southern Italy have lost 700 GWh (25% of 
the maximum producible energy) due to the limited current-
carrying capacity of the high-voltage transmission lines and the 
scarce power demand in the area near the plants, 
corresponding to an economic loss of 144 millions of Euros. 
The deployment of small-size renewable power generation 
at the electric distribution level is also rapidly changing the 
nature of this infrastructure. Traditionally a passive recipient 
of a unidirectional flow from the transmission network, the 
distribution network should now support injections of active 
power from its users. In this perspective, both the transmission 
and the distribution networks require a real-time control 
approach with an increasing level of complexity due to the 
broad space distribution of the generators and to the high 
degree of variability that characterizes electrical power from 
renewable sources [6]. 
Electric transmission networks already have some 
instrumentation that allows control centers to automatically 
monitor power flows and open or close circuit breakers at 
substations as a result of human- and computer-generated 
control decisions [5]. This communication level is based on 
heterogeneous technologies and platforms which are poorly 
integrated [14]. On the contrary, distribution networks lack 
instruments for the information exchange and the system 
control. 
Considering the present lack of standards, the 
communication network will have to evolve with the 
developing Smart Grid. Communication links will need to use 
all kinds of resources, varying from hard-wired links to fiber 
optics, power line communication [15], wireless [16], satellites 
and micro-wave links, in order to serve the large geographical 
territory covered by the smart grid [7]. All of these 
communication links constitute opportunities but also 
introduce vulnerabilities, due to functional failures and 
exposition to malevolent attacks aiming at causing system-
wide instabilities and blackouts, especially if they are not 
protected in dedicated supports but can be accessed over the 
Internet. 
The coupling between the electric power and 
communication networks in Smart Grids raises safety and 
security issues [17]. In the smart grids, the continuous delivery 
of electric power is supported by the communication 
infrastructure and, vice versa, the exchange of information 
relies on the energy input of the electric power grid. Faults 
originating in one of the two networks impact on the other 
interdependent one. For example, the interruption or even the 
delay of the information flow communicating a control action 
upon the electric power grid may result in power unbalance 
and system instability that could trigger a blackout [7], [18]. 
Vulnerability analysis must then be concerned with the 
interconnected, mutually dependent systems to properly 
account for the influences and limitations which the interacting 
electrical power grids and communication networks impose on 
the individual system operating conditions, for avoiding fault 
propagation by designing redundancies and alternative modes 
of operations, and by detecting and recognizing threats. 
This paper looks into the vulnerabilities of the electric 
power grid and associated communication network, in the face 
of intermittent power generation and uncertain demand within 
a complex network framework of analysis of smart grids. 
Complex network approaches for the analysis of distributed 
systems [19]-[25] take a holistic perspective in which the 
overall system behavior emerges as the result of the complex 
interactions of its constituents. The two main objectives of the 
analysis are (i) to identify preliminary vulnerabilities by 
topology-driven and dynamic analysis, and (ii) to guide and 
focus further detailed analyses of critical areas based on 
physical codes (e.g. incorporating line impedances and 
Kirchhoff's laws to assess the power flows from the generators 
to the loads of an electric network). Purely-topological, 
complex network models of the electric power grid [19]-[25], 
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which abstract the physical details of the provided service and 
characterize the topology of network systems, are here 
extended to capture essential operating features, i.e. the power 
is routed through the least resistant paths, the components are 
physically specialized in “generators” and “distributors”, the 
lines are subjected to limits on their carrying-flow capacities 
and the power generation and consumption levels vary within a 
range of uncertain values. 
In order to account for the interdependence effects due to 
the coupling [26], we adopt a framework in which the 
communication delays are integrated in the electric CI. The 
communication network is assumed to be made of dedicated 
control signal channels. The coupling between the two 
interdependent networks occurs at the components level. Each 
node of the electric network is coupled with a router that 
ensures communication with the other elements of the network. 
The time required to exchange data from the measurement 
location to a control center or data concentrator, and the time 
required ultimately to communicate these data to the control 
devices, is collectively denoted as communication delay or 
latency. As stated before, excessive communication delay may 
result in power unbalance and system instability that could 
trigger a blackout. The calculation method of the 
communication delay encompasses several sources, including 
routing delays which are modeled as a series of M/M/1 queues, 
which symbolizes the cumulative time delay along the routing 
path from the measurement site to the control unit [27]. 
According to the shorthand notation developed for queuing 
systems, the three-part descriptor M/M/1 denotes a one-server 
queuing system with exponentially-distributed inter-arrival and 
service times [28]. 
We assess the vulnerability of the two interdependent 
networks subject to the specific hazard defined by the request 
of increase of power generation due to enhanced power 
consumption of one load. To this aim, we introduce 
vulnerability measures that identify the most critical 
communication time delays, and assess the probability that a 
reduction in the functionality of the communication system 
will generate a faulty condition in the electric power grid. 
The paper is organized as follows: the embraced 
interpretation of vulnerability is detailed in Section II; the 
modeling of the smart grid CI with interdependencies is 
presented in Section III; Section III.A describes the model of 
power flow in the electrical transmission network and Section 
III.B describes the model of information flow in the 
communication network; Section III.C details the simulation 
procedure devised for analyzing the vulnerabilities of the two 
coupled CIs.  In Section IV, the proposed model is applied to 
two interdependent networks whose structures are based on the 
380 kV Italian power transmission network [29], [30], and 
Section IV.A discusses the numerical results. Conclusions are 
drawn in Section V. 
 
II. VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURES 
While the concept of risk is fairly mature and consensually 
agreed, the concept of vulnerability is still evolving and not yet 
established. In general terms, risk refers to a combination of 
the probability of occurrence of a specific event leading to 
loss, damage or injury and its extent. These quantities and their 
associated uncertainties are regarded as being numerically 
quantifiable. 
The term vulnerability has been introduced as the concept of 
risk is somehow limited in portraying the hazard-centric 
perception of disasters. A hazard of low intensity could have 
severe consequences, while a hazard of high intensity could 
have negligible consequences: the level of vulnerability is 
making the difference [31]. The concept of vulnerability seen 
as a global system property focuses on three elements [32]: (i) 
degree of loss and damages due to the impact of a hazard; (ii) 
degree of exposure to the hazards, i.e., likelihood of being 
exposed to hazards of a certain degree and susceptibility of an 
element at the risk of suffering loss and damages; (iii) degree 
of resilience, i.e., the ability of a system to anticipate, cope 
with/absorb, resist and recover from the impact of a hazard or 
disaster. 
Vulnerability is here interpreted as a flaw in the design, 
implementation or operation of an infrastructure system, or its 
elements, that renders it susceptible to destruction or 
incapacitation when exposed to a hazard or threat, or reduces 
its capacity to resume new stable conditions [1], [33]. The 
latter can be provided with a likelihood (frequency) while a 
measure for destruction or incapacitation needs specific 
elaborations. In this study, the vulnerability of the two 
interdependent networks is expressed in terms of frequency of 
load-shedding actions due to excessive communication time 
delay, with respect to several ranges of power increase request.  
The goals of vulnerability analysis, and the associated 
modeling and simulation efforts, could be: (i) given a system 
and the end state of interest, identify the set of events and 
event sequences that can cause damages and loss effects; (ii) 
identify the relevant set of ‘‘initiating events’’ and evaluate 
their cascading impact on a subset of elements, or the system 
as a whole; (iii) given a system and the end state of interest, 
identify the set of events or respective event sequences that 
would cause this effect; (iv) given the set of initiating events 
and observed outcomes, determine and elaborate on 
(inter)dependencies (within the system and among systems) 
and on coupling effects of different orders [1]. 
The achievement of these goals relies on the analysis of the 
system, its parts and their interactions within the system; the 
analysis must account for the environment which the system 
lives in and operates, and finally for the objectives the system 
is expected to achieve. The ultimate goal is to identify the 
vulnerabilities for managing and reducing them.  
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III. DYNAMIC MODEL OF INTERDEPENDENT NETWORKS AND 
SIMULATION PROCEDURE 
The electric power grid and the communication network are 
represented by two graphs G1(N1,K1) and G2(N2,K2) with N1, 
N2 nodes connected by K1, K2 links, respectively. In our case, 
it has been assumed (without loss of generality) that N1=N2=N 
and K1=K2=K. The networks are specified by NN adjacency 
(connection) matrices whose entries are 1 if there is an edge 
joining node i to node j or 0, otherwise, and by connection 
length matrices whose entries are the physical length of the 
line connecting node i to node j if there is an edge joining node 
i to node j or 0, otherwise. 
In the electric power grid, the nodes correspond to buses. 
They are further specified into NG generators, i.e. the providers 
of the service, and ND distributors, i.e. the recipient of the 
service. The edges correspond to electrical connections.  
In the communication network, the nodes correspond to 
routers and the edges to dedicated control signal channels that 
connect them.  
The interdependencies within the CI are due to the presence 
of routers on each electrical bus. Routers send and receive 
control commands that try to match the generation profile with 
the power demand in the electrical network according to the 
increase of electrical load.  
The system, then, does not rely on a centralized control 
center. Control decisions are locally taken at the router/bus 
level and communicated to the other interacting buses/routers 
[33]. During this process, the total time required to the system 
to balance generation and demand, i.e. the communication 
time delay, T, is monitored. 
A. The functional model of power flow in the electrical 
transmission network 
The functional model of the electric power grid abstracts the 
physical details while at the same time capturing its essential 
operating features. The elements of the network are 
characterized by loading values normalized in the interval [0, 
1] that identify how close to the limit capacity they are 
operating. For generator and distributor nodes, L
i
  [0, 1] 
identifies the fraction of maximum power that generator i is 
injecting in the network, or alternatively, the fraction of 
maximum power that distributor i is absorbing from the 
network. The value L
i
 = 1 identifies the maximum power that a 
generator i can inject in the system, or alternatively, the 
maximum power that distributor i has agreed to receive by 
contractual agreement.  For lines, L
ij
  [0, 1] identifies the 
fraction of the maximum flow-carrying capacity that the line 
connecting node i to node j is serving. The value L
ij
 = 1 
indicates that the line connecting node i to node j, hereafter 
also called line ij, is operating at its maximum flow carrying-
capacity.   
The loading scenario is identified when the N values of L
i
 
and the K values of L
ij
 are known. To account for the 
variability that characterizes generation and consumption, the 
L
i
 values are sampled from uniform probability distributions in 
the intervals [LG
min
, LG
max
] for generators and [LD
min
, LD
max
] 
for distributors.  
We assume that the flow of electrical power from generator 
i to distributor j follows the least resistant path between i and j. 
We further assume line resistance to be proportional to line 
length; hence the least resistant paths and the shortest paths 
coincide. We find the shortest paths that connect any generator 
i to any distributor j, and rank in descending order the lines 
with respect to their participation to the shortest paths. The L
ij
 
values are then also sampled from uniform probability 
distributions. In particular, two probability distributions are 
assumed that describe two possible states [Llow
min
, Llow
max
] for 
lines that are likely to accommodate low values of power, and 
[Lhigh
min
, Lhigh
max
] for lines that are likely to accommodate large 
values of power. To this aim, The L
ij
 value is sampled from 
[Lhigh
min
, Lhigh
max
] if line ij belongs to the first half of the rank, 
while it is sampled from [Llow
min
, Llow
max
] if line ij belongs to 
the second half of the rank. This sampling procedure assigns 
on the average a higher power flow to those lines that are 
traversed by many generator-distributor shortest paths, i.e. that 
have a high betweenness centrality [36]. 
In the following, we assess how the CI copes with an 
increase in the electrical power demand. To this aim, starting 
from an initial loading scenario, we simulate a request of 
additional power, W, by distributor i. We assume that W is 
described by a uniform probability distribution [W
min
, W
max
]. 
The overall load L
i
 + W may also possibly exceed the 
maximum contractual power that i has agreed to receive from 
the system, i.e. 1. 
B. The model of information flow in the communication 
network 
In [27], Stahlhut et al. assess how the communication delay 
for measurements and control signals in a power system 
impacts the control system response. In the following, we 
embrace their calculation of the communication delay, and 
assume that the data transmitted are in the form of packets. 
The packets are a formatted block of information and are 
typically arranged in three sections: the header, the payload, 
and the trailer. The header has the following information: 
packet length, origin and destination address, packet type, and 
packet number (if a sequence of packets is being sent). The 
payload carries the data taken from the measurement. The 
trailer is at the end of the packet and carries information which 
permits the receiving device to identify the end of the packet. 
The time delay calculation encompasses several different 
delays that occur in communication systems. These delays 
typically are: 
• serial delays: the delay of having bits being sent one after 
another; 
• “between packet” serial delays: the time after a packet is 
sent to when the next packet is sent; 
• propagation delays: the time required to transmit data over 
a particular communication medium; 
• routing delays: the time required for data to be sent 
through a router, and resent to another location. 
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The total signal time delay may be represented as 
 
s b p rT T T T T     (1) 
s s rT P D  (2) 
PT l v  (3) 
 
where Ts is the serial delay, Tb is the between packet delay, 
Tp is the propagation delay, Tr is the routing delay, Ps is the 
size of the packet (bits/packet), Dr is the data rate of the 
network, l is the length of the communication medium, and v is 
the velocity at which the data are sent through the 
communication medium (e.g., 0.6 to c, where c is the speed of 
light). 
Routers are a major part of the communication 
infrastructure in a communication network. There are a 
number of methods by which routing delay can be 
approximated [37]-[41]. A simple and fast calculation method 
of routing delay can be used to approximate the delay at a 
router: this calculation method is based on a series of M/M/1 
queues [28], in which a path from the measurement to the 
control center is traced, and all of the routing delays are added 
up to represent the total routing delay for the measurement. 
For this calculation, 
 
 
1
N
i
r r
i
T T

  (4) 
 
where Tr is the total routing delay, 
 i
rT  is the routing delay 
for a single router at location i, and N is the total number of 
routers. The M/M/1 queue is used to approximate the value of 
 i
rT  for each router i, and it is modeled as a one-server 
queuing system with exponentially-distributed inter-arrival and 
service times [28]. The M/M/1 queue has several associated 
performance measures such as: the average number of 
customers in line, the average number of customers in the 
system, the time waiting in line, and the time required to pass 
through the system [39], [42]. In this context, the customers 
are the sensory messages in the communication network. A 
noteworthy performance measure is the total waiting time 
(system time), and this encompasses both the amount of time 
waiting in line (waiting time), as well as the amount of time 
being served (service time). The total waiting time is 
quantified as  
 
 

   
 (5) 
 
where   is the rate at which objects come in the system 
(e.g., packets/s) and µ is the rate at which the objects are being 
served (e.g., packets/s). The routing time 
 i
rT  for each router i 
can be estimated from (5) and used in (4) to calculate the total 
routing delay 
 
 
      1
iN
r i i i
i
T

  

 
  (6) 
 
We assume that information from router i to router j flows 
along the shortest path connecting i and j. Therefore, the total 
routing time, Tr, from router i to router j is evaluated as the 
sum of the routing delays of the encountered routers along the 
shortest path connecting i and j. 
The maximum time delay that the smart grid can tolerate 
depends on the system task to be executed and ranges from 
tenths of milliseconds up to tenths of seconds [6], [7]. For 
example, the standard specifies that for an unintentional island 
in which the distributed generation energizes a portion of the 
distribution network, the control system shall detect the island 
and cease to energize the portion within 2s of the formation of 
an island. Moreover, latencies in the tens of ms allow rapid 
detection of faults and are the accepted fault detection times 
[7]. On the contrary, voltage and active power regulation 
actions should be accomplished within 10s and some minutes, 
respectively [6]. 
 
C. Simulation procedure 
To test the vulnerability of the CI with respect to the 
stability upon a power increase request, W, we proceed in 
successive stages as follows: 
1. All N components of the electric power grid are working 
under independent uniformly random initial loads. In 
particular, L
i
  [LGmin, LGmax] for generator i = 1,…NG, L
i
   
[LD
min
, LD
max
] for distributor i = 1+ NG,…ND + NG, and L
ij
 
 [Lhigh
min
, Lhigh
max
], or L
ij
  [Llow
min
, Llow
max
], if line ij 
belongs to the first or second half of the betweenness 
centrality rank (Section III.A), respectively, i , j = 1,…, N. 
These values identify the loading scenario. 
2. A distributor node i is chosen randomly and its power 
demand is increased from L
i
 to L
i
 + W, where W is sampled 
from the uniform probability distribution [W
min
, W
max
].  
3. The NG generators that are connected to i are sorted by 
ascending distance from i, i.e. ascending resistance. The 
closest generator j = 1 is selected. Communication delay T is 
set to zero. 
4. Distributor i queries generator j for additional power W. 
Generator j answers providing the value of the power 
available to i, i.e.    min ,1 jSG j W L  , where 1 - Lj is 
the maximum additional power that j can provide. 
Communication time delay, T, is updated. 
5. Check whether the shortest path between i and j can 
accommodate the additional power SG(j). To this aim, every 
line yz on the shortest path between i and j is tested for 
infringement of the current-carrying capacity limit in the 
new configuration, i.e. L
yx
 + SG(j)  1. If at least one limit is 
exceeded the additional power is updated to the maximum 
power value that satisfies all the line constraints, i.e. 
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   min 1 yz
yz
SG j L  , for every line yz on the shortest path 
between distributor i and generator j, SG(j) = 0 in case that a 
line yz is already operating at its maximum flow-carrying 
capacity. The residual power that distributor i still requires, 
U(i), and the power that generator j could not supply, UG(j), 
are evaluated as    
1
( )
j
s
U i UG j W SG s

   . They are 
recorded for the vulnerability evaluation. Communication 
time delay, T, is updated. 
6. The generator index j is incremented by 1, and the 
procedure is returned to step 4 until U(i) = 0, in case of a 
successful system state, or j = NG and U(i) > 0, in case the 
power request is not satisfied. The final communication time 
delay, T, is recorded. 
The value of U(i) at the end of the simulation is the fraction 
of the additional load W that has to be shed in order to balance 
the power generation and the power consumption. Therefore, 
we assume that load can be continuously shed.  
Furthermore, it can be noticed that the power that generator 
j could not supply, UG(j) can be greater than 0 for two 
different causes: either j is operating at its maximum capacity, 
or there is no path for the power produced by j for reaching the 
distributor i where it is needed. This feature of the algorithm is 
consistent with the behavior of smart grids that include 
intermittent and remotely-generated electricity from renewable 
energy sources, as discussed in Section I. 
To incorporate the effects of load and generation 
uncertainties, the above algorithm is embedded in a Monte 
Carlo simulation framework, in which a large number of 
additional load requests, e.g., 100000 in this study, is 
simulated for the same range of [LG
min
, LG
max
], [LD
min
, LD
max
], 
[Lhigh
min
, Lhigh
max
], [Llow
min
, Llow
max
] and [W
min
, W
max
], in order to 
obtain statistically significant results for various realizations of 
the same average loading condition. 
During the simulations, relevant statistics are recorded to 
evaluate different vulnerability indexes, i.e. the distribution of 
the communication time delay, T, in case of a successful (no 
load-shedding is required to balance consumption and 
generation) or unsuccessful (load-shedding is required to 
balance consumption and generation) final system state. 
The effects of the interdependencies between the electric 
power grid and the communication network are evaluated with 
respect to the communication time delay, T , that elapses from 
the instant in which the request for power increase is done, 
until the request is fulfilled. As seen in Section III.B, the 
maximum time delay requirements, T
MAX
, for the smart grid 
range from tenths of milliseconds up to tenths of seconds 
depending on the system task to be executed. In this respect, 
various communication network configurations differing for 
the value of the data rate, Dr, can be tested to quantify the 
probability that a malfunction in the communication system, 
i.e. a communication delay, will generate a faulty condition in 
the electric power grid. The compliance with T
MAX
, i.e. T < 
T
MAX
, is evaluated at the end of the simulations. 
 
IV. CASE STUDY 
The approach to evaluate the vulnerability of the smart grid 
CI with interdependencies between power and communication 
networks introduced in Section III, is exemplified with 
reference to the topological network of the 380 kV Italian 
power transmission network (Fig. 1), focusing only on its 
structure with no further reference on the electrical properties, 
coupled with a dedicated communication network. For 
simplicity, but with no loss of generality, we assume that the 
two networks have the same topologies. The developed 
methodology can be applied to interdependent networks with 
different topologies. The 380 kV Italian power transmission 
network is a branch of a high voltage level transmission, which 
can be modeled as a network of N=127 nodes (NG=30 
generator and ND=97 distributor nodes) connected by K=171 
links [29], [30], defined by its N×N adjacency (connection) 
matrix aij and connection length matrix lij. We assume that the 
communication network consists of dedicated control signal 
channels, which follow the same layout of the overhead 
electrical lines. Therefore, both the electric power grid and the 
communication network are described by the same aij and lij 
matrices (without loss of generality): the topology and the 
geographical location of the 380 kV Italian power transmission 
network components serve as reference. 
 
 
 7 
 
Fig. 1.  The 380 kV Italian power transmission network [29], [30]. 
 
 
We test the vulnerability of the two interdependent networks 
with respect to the stability upon a power increase request, W, 
for eight increasing ranges of [W
min
, W
max
] reported in Table II, 
while the other system parameters are constant and specified in 
Table I. We assume that the electric power grid operates with 
an average 20% safety margin for all the components except 
for the highly loaded lines which operate with an average 15% 
safety margin. The data for the communication network have 
been taken from [27] and assume a dedicated communication 
network. 
 
TABLE I 
SPECIFICATIONS OF THE ELECTRIC POWER GRID AND OF THE COMMUNICATION 
NETWORK USED IN THE SIMULATIONS 
LGmin 0.7 Data rate of the network, Dr 5 Mbps 
LGmax 0.9 Between packet delay, Tb 0 
LDmin 0.7 Packet size, Ps 2 kb 
LDmax 0.9 Data velocity, v 0.6c 
Lhigh
min 0.8 Measurement rate,  50 packets/s 
Lhigh
max 0.9 Router serving rate, µ 50 Mbps 
Llow
min 0.7   
Llow
max 0.9   
 
Then, we test the vulnerability of the two interdependent 
networks with respect to the stability upon a power increase 
request, W  [Wmin, Wmax], for thirteen values of data rate of 
the network, Dr, in Table III which identify different dedicated 
network configurations for the communication CI. We aim at 
quantifying the probability that a malfunction in the 
communication system, i.e. a communication delay, will 
generate a faulty condition in the electric power grid. 
 
A. Numerical results 
Table II reports the frequency of unsatisfied power request, 
i.e. load-shedding intervention, with respect to the eight 
sampling intervals [W
min
, W
max
]. As W
max
 increases, a greater 
amount of additional load W is requested on the average and 
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the generators closest to the increasing load cannot provide the 
total required amount. Thus, distant generators are queried, but 
power cannot always find a path to reach the increasing load 
due to growing likelihood of line limit infringement along the 
path, and the system has little chances to fully satisfy W. 
 
TABLE II 
FREQUENCY OF UNSATISFIED POWER REQUEST, I.E. LOAD-SHEDDING 
INTERVENTION, AND THE ASSOCIATED STANDARD ERROR VS. THE WIDTHS OF 
THE EIGHT UNIFORM SAMPLING INTERVALS FOR THE ADDITIONAL POWER, W. 
THE NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT DIGITS THAT WE REPORT THROUGHOUT THE 
PAPER IS EVALUATED BY YONEDA’S RULE [43]. 
Sampling interval for the 
additional power request, W 
Frequency of 
unsatisfied request 
Standard error 
[0.10, 0.15] 0.6670 % 0.1252 % 
[0.10, 0.20] 1.1950 % 0.1263 % 
[0.10, 0.25] 2.6000 % 0.1717 % 
[0.10, 0.30] 6.565 % 0.384 % 
[0.10, 0.35] 11.788 % 0.316 % 
[0.10, 0.40] 17.587 % 0.554 % 
[0.10, 0.45] 23.083 % 0.425 % 
[0.10, 0.50] 28.835 % 0.553 % 
 
 
[Fig. 2-7 in the previous manuscript were removed in order 
to comply with the  12 page limit for IEEE Transactions on 
Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Part A –Systems and Humans 
regular papers. Table 3-6 in the previous manuscript were 
removed in order to comply with the  12 page limit for IEEE 
Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Part A –
Systems and Humans regular papers. The comments to the 
removed results were also removed.] 
 
 
The frequency of unsatisfied power request in Table II 
characterizes the self-limitations that the electric power grid 
imposes on its own operations due to its structural 
configuration, the limits on flow-carrying capacities of lines, 
the intermittent nature of power generation from renewable 
energy sources and the uncertainties in the load demand 
profile. We now devote our attention to the temporal aspects 
that characterize the power balance procedure in the CI. In this 
respect, Fig. 2 shows the probability distribution function of 
the communication time delay, PDF(T), when the request to 
increase load is not satisfied by generators, i.e. U > 0, for the 
eight sampling intervals [W
min
, W
max
] in Table II. Fig. 2 is 
relative to situations in which the additional load request W 
could not be met by generators, and the communication signal 
spans the entire extension of the network to query for 
additional generation capability. This appears from the larger 
T values in the PDF(T) plot, which are the communication time 
delays needed to route the power to the increasing load bus 
from remote regions of the network. 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Probability distribution function of the communication time delay, 
PDF(T), when the request to increase load is not satisfied by generators, i.e. U 
> 0, for the eight sampling intervals [Wmin, Wmax] in Table II. 
 
The differences in the communication time delay, T, 
distribution for normal operations and load shedding appear in 
Fig. 3, where the CDF(T)’s are plotted for these two situations 
and encompass the eight sampling intervals [W
min
, W
max
] in 
Table II. We expect that CDF(T) for normal operations (solid 
curve in Fig. 3) is shifted to smaller T values than the one 
relative to load-shedding interventions (dashed curve in Fig. 
3). When the extra power request is satisfied, U = 0, only a 
fraction of the total number of generators is queried for 
additional power. On the contrary, when the extra power 
request is not satisfied, U > 0, the communication signal spans 
the entire generation set looking for additional generation 
capability that is not found. 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Cumulative distribution function of the communication time delay, T, 
when the request to increase load is not satisfied, i.e. U > 0 (dashed line), and 
when the request to increase load is fully satisfied by generators, i.e. U = 0 
(solid line), for the eight sampling intervals [Wmin, Wmax] in Table II. 
 
The communication time delay, T, is distributed within the 
intervals T[62.6, 951] ms and T[643, 2000] ms, in case of 
normal operations and of load-shedding actions, respectively. 
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Given the maximum admissible communication time delay, 
T
MAX
, Fig. 3 allows identifying the frequency of load-shedding 
due to the excess of communication latency, i.e. T > T
MAX
, 
even for those loading scenarios that would eventually result in 
U = 0 otherwise (solid line in Fig. 3). As detailed in Section 
III.B, T
MAX
 depends on the system task to be executed and 
ranges from tenths of milliseconds up to tenths of seconds. In 
this context, T
MAX
 can be thought of as the maximum time 
delay before instabilities arise in the electric power grid due to 
the imbalance between generation and consumption. If the 
value T
MAX
 equal to 100 ms is assumed, we evaluate CDF(T = 
T
MAX
 = 100 ms) = 96.77% ± 0.06%, and we discover that due 
to latency constraints the frequency of faulty conditions is 
3.23% ± 0.06% even for those scenarios that we classified as 
normal operations because the additional power request is 
fully satisfied, i.e. U = 0 (solid line in Fig. 3). If a narrower 
latency constraint is assumed, e.g., T
MAX
 = 50 ms, we evaluate 
CDF(T = T
MAX
 = 50 ms) = 87.85% ± 0.10%, and conclude that 
the frequency of faulty conditions is 12.2% ± 0.10% even for 
those scenarios that we classified as normal operations because 
the additional power request is fully satisfied, i.e. U = 0. 
The frequency of faulty conditions due to the excess of 
communication time delay, T, quantifies the limitations that the 
communication system imposes on the operations of the 
interdependent electric system. It can be used to measure the 
strength of the interdependency or the degree of the coupling 
between these two systems within the CI. 
After having found an index that quantifies the extent to 
which the delay in the communication network impacts on the 
operations of the electric power grid, we investigate how the 
frequency of faulty conditions due to the excess of 
communication time delay, T, varies with respect to different 
configurations of the communication network. We test several 
networks characterized by decreasing values of the data rate, 
Dr (Table III first column), that is defined as the number of 
bits that are conveyed or processed per unit of time. Since 
higher investments correspond to higher Dr, this kind of 
analysis allows identifying the optimal communication 
network that respects the constraint relative to the frequency of 
faulty conditions due to the excess of communication time 
delay, T. Alternatively, we can evaluate the extent to which a 
malfunction that reduces the speed of communication, Dr, will 
impact on the power grid due to the interdependencies between 
the two systems. 
Fig. 4 shows the cumulative distribution functions of the 
communication time delay, T, for decreasing values of the data 
rate of the communication network, Dr, reported in Table III 
first column, and W  [0.10, 0.25]. These results correspond 
to scenarios of the electric power grid for which a final balance 
between generation and consumption could be found, i.e. U = 
0. Fig. 4 allows evaluating the extent to which Dr values 
influence the degree of coupling between the two CIs. Smaller 
Dr values produce CDF(T) that are shifted to larger T values. If 
we assume a maximum admissible communication time delay, 
T
MAX
, from Fig. 4 we identify the frequency of load-shedding 
due to the excess of communication latency, i.e. T  > T
MAX
, 
even for those loading scenarios that would eventually result in 
U equal to 0 otherwise. As an example, if T
MAX
 is equal to 100 
ms, the scenarios that are found to the right of the vertical 
dash-dotted line in Fig. 4 will require load-shedding activity. 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Cumulative distribution functions of the communication time delay, 
T, for decreasing values of the data rate of the communication network, Dr, 
reported in Table III and W  [0.10, 0.25]. Smaller Dr values yield 
distributions shifted towards larger T values. The vertical dash-dotted line 
indicates the maximum allowable communication time delay, TMAX = 100 ms. 
 
We quantify the effects of the interdependency between the 
two networks by two complementary indexes that provide 
safety margins with respect to the coupled operations of the 
two CIs. The 95
th
 percentile of the distribution of T quantifies 
the minimum admissible time delay, T
MAX
, that limits to 5% the 
frequency of load-shedding due to excessive latency. From 
Table III second column and Fig. 5, we see how the 95
th
 
percentile varies with Dr.  
 
 
Fig. 5.  95th percentile of the communication time delay, T, vs. the values of 
the data rate of the communication network, Dr, and W  [0.10, 0.25]. 
 
For small Dr, e.g., Dr = 2‧ 10
4
 bps, the system must tolerate 
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a minimum latency T
MAX
 greater than or equal to 2.069 s ± 
0.140 s, in order to limit to 5% the frequency of load-shedding 
due to excessive latency. In other words, power increase 
operations that must be safely carried out within a time smaller 
than 2.069 s ± 0.140 s should not be attempted, if one wants to 
comply with the safety margin of 5% load-shedding frequency. 
Conversely, if Dr is equal to 5‧ 10
6
 bps, the system can admit 
a minimum latency as small as T
MAX
 equal to or greater than 
0.6678 s ± 0.0149 s, and the frequency of load-shedding due to 
excessive latency would still be limited to 5%. 
 
TABLE III 
95TH PERCENTILE OF THE COMMUNICATION TIME DELAY, T, (SECOND COLUMN) 
AND PROBABILITY THAT T  TMAX (THIRD COLUMN) WITH STANDARD 
ERRORS, FOR DECREASING VALUES OF THE DATA RATE OF THE 
COMMUNICATION NETWORK, DR, (FIRST COLUMN) AND W  [0.10, 0.25]. 
Data rate of the 
network, Dr [bps] 
95th Percentile of the 
communication time 
delay, T [ms] 
P(T  TMAX) = CDF(T = TMAX 
= 100ms) 
5‧ 106 66.789 ± 1.489 96.77% ± 0.06% 
2.5‧ 106 80.94 ± 2.95 96.47% ± 0.06% 
1‧ 106 108.986 ± 1.029 94.69% ± 0.07% 
5‧ 105 148.97 ± 4.31 88.89% ± 0.10% 
3‧ 105 202.22 ± 3.25 81.14% ± 0.13% 
2‧ 105 268.91 ± 6.27 72.48% ± 0.14% 
1‧ 105 468.9 ± 12.5 31.18% ± 0.15% 
9‧ 104 513.33 ± 3.31 30.99% ± 0.15% 
7‧ 104 640 ± 53 0% 
5‧ 104 869 ± 41 0% 
2‧ 104 2069 ± 140 0% 
9‧ 103 4513 ± 300 0% 
5‧ 103 8069 ± 200 0% 
 
Because the admissible latency T
MAX
 is a constraint in the 
system, a somewhat more intuitive safety margin is provided 
with respect to P(T  TMAX) = CDF(T = TMAX), i.e. the 
probability of final safe conditions (no load-shedding is 
required), given the admissible latency T
MAX
. In Table III third 
column and Fig. 6, P(T  TMAX = 100ms) = CDF(T = TMAX = 
100ms) values are presented as functions of Dr, given W  
[0.10, 0.25] and T
MAX
 = 100ms. From Table III third column, 
we see that when Dr = 1‧ 10
5
 bps, the probability of final safe 
conditions is 31.18% ± 0.15% and, consequently, the 
frequency of load-shedding due to excessive latency is 68.82% 
± 0.15%. 
Fig. 6 displays how the probability of final safe conditions 
decreases as Dr progressively decreases from Dr = 1‧ 10
6
 bps 
to Dr = 5‧ 10
3
 bps. P(T  TMAX = 100ms) exhibits a 
catastrophic transition in the range Dr  [3‧ 10
5
, 7‧ 104] bps, 
as Dr values decrease below 3‧ 10
5
 bps. No final safe 
condition is realized below Dr = 7‧ 10
4
 bps, i.e. every 
additional power request, W, involves some load-shedding 
actions due to excessive latency in the communication, T > 
T
MAX
. 
The information in Fig. 6 can be used during the design 
phase of the CI with the aim of identifying the communication 
specifications that comply with the required safety standards, 
given T
MAX
, i.e. the smallest admissible time delay, and [W
min
, 
W
max
], i.e. the electric load profile. In our example, a 
communication network with Dr  1.26‧ 10
6
 bps has to be 
selected to comply with the 95% safety margin, i.e. 5% 
probability of load-shedding, when T
MAX
 = 100ms and W  
[0.10, 0.25]. Furthermore, the information in Fig. 6 can be 
used during operations to quantify the extent to which a 
possible loss of quality in the communication, i.e. a Dr 
reduction, impacts on the electric power grid. In our example, 
a Dr reduction from Dr = 5‧ 10
6
 bps (normal operations) to Dr 
= 1.94‧ 105 bps (anomalous operations), entails a reduction of 
the safety margin from 96.77% ± 0.06% to approximately 
70%, i.e. the probability of load-shedding increases from 
3.23% ± 0.06% to approximately 30%. Yet, most important is 
the fact that an additional small Dr reduction to Dr = 7‧ 10
4
 
bps entails the complete disappearance of the safety margin. 
Therefore, the knowledge of the relation in Fig. 6 is vital for 
operating the CI with interdependencies in a region of the 
system parameters that is far from the catastrophic phase 
transition point. 
 
 
Fig. 6.  Probability of final safe conditions, i.e. P(T  TMAX) = CDF(T = 
TMAX = 100ms), given the admissible latency TMAX, vs. data rate of the 
communication network, Dr, and W  [0.10, 0.25]. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have looked into the vulnerabilities that 
arise when complex networks are coupled, with reference to 
smart grids modeled as a combination of the electric power 
grid and the communication network. We have adopted a 
modeling framework in which the communication delays are 
integrated in the electric CI. The complex network approach 
proposed extends the purely-topological models of the electric 
power grid to capture essential operating features, i.e. the 
power is routed through the least resistant paths, the 
components are physically specialized in “generators” and 
“distributors”, and the lines are subjected to limits on their 
carrying-flow capacities; moreover, it includes the further 
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complexity that arises from the variability of power generation 
from renewable energy sources and intermittent load 
consumption. However, given the somewhat abstract level of 
the modeling supporting complex network analysis, the 
insights gained with respect to the vulnerable areas in the 
system (first findings) may not be clear-cut, and major hidden 
vulnerabilities may still be expected. Then, to accurately 
model the physical behavior of the interconnected systems, 
computational frameworks that propagate the flows of power 
and information based on physical laws have to be embraced, 
and more detailed information about the system and its 
operating environment may be needed. For large, real-scale 
systems, this requires the development of adequate 
computational methodologies through clustering computing, 
co-operative simulation, or similar architectures [44]-[48]. 
We have quantified the limitations that both the electric 
power grid and the communication network impose on the 
operations of the CI with interdependencies, when a load bus 
demands additional power from the generators. In the 
application to the 380 kV Italian power transmission network, 
with the assumptions made and the numerical data used, we 
have observed that a factual indicator for quantifying the 
coupling strength between the two integrated systems is the 
frequency of load-shedding actions due to excessive 
communication time delay. By means of this indicator, we 
have evaluated the extent to which a loss of quality in the 
communication impacts on the electric power grid, and we 
have selected appropriate communication specifications, i.e. 
the data rate of the network, that comply with the required 
safety requirements in the electric power grid. 
Finally, we have detected a catastrophic phase transition 
point in the frequency of faulty conditions with respect to the 
data rate of the communication network. The CI with 
interdependencies safely operate only in a region of the system 
parameters that are far from this catastrophic transition point. 
To this aim, the introduction of adequate safety margins with 
respect to the data rate of the communication network is 
suggested. 
In summary, the main contributions to the knowledge 
generated for the network general case are: (i) the extension of 
the purely-topological complex network modeling framework 
by inclusion of relevant physical aspects of the system; (ii) the 
use of the frequency of load-shedding actions due to excessive 
communication time delay as a quantitative indicator for 
quantifying the vulnerability of the smart grid; (iii) the 
detection of a catastrophic phase transition with respect to the 
data rate of the communication network in the smart grid. 
[APPENDIX] 
[Appendix was removed because it was related to the results 
of Section IV.A which were also removed.] 
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